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ESSAYS
TAKING AND GIVING: POLICE POWER, PUBLIC VALUE,
AND PRIVATE RIGHT
By
GERALD TORRES*
"So long as government action constitutes a taking and a giving to the same
individuals in the same proportions, all is well."'
"Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made
there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases."
2
* 1995 Natural Resources Law Institute Distinguished Visitor, Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis & Clark College, 1995; Henry Oswald Head Centennial Professor of Real Prop-
erty Law, University of Texas School of Law; formerly counsel to the Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice. This Essay was originally presented as the Natural Resources Law
Institute's 1995 Distinguished Visitor Lecture, September 14, 1995. Many of the themes I
advance here remain to be more fully developed.
1 RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
211 (1985). This view also characterizes the work of Professor Donald Hagman. See, e.g.,
Donald G. Hagman, Wipeouts and Their Mitigation, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOuTS: LAND
VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 5, 5-14 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean Misczynski eds., 1978)
[hereinafter WINDFALLS FOR WIPEoUTs]; Donald G. Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, in WIND-
FALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra, at 20, 20-27; Donald G. Hagman, Compensable Regulation, in
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra, at 256, 256-307. As economist William Fischel points out,
the benefit-offset principle is based precisely on this insight. WILLIA A. FISCHEL, REGULA-
TORY TAINGS: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PoLmcs 80-83 (1995). The strictness implied by Profes-
sor Richard Epstein's formulation is not required in practice. Id. at 81-82. Fischel notes the
efficiency effects of the benefit-offset approach and traces the uneven history of the applica-
tion of this principle. Id. at 84-99; see also Charles M. Haar & Barbara Hering, The Determi-
nation, of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CAL. L. REV. 833 (1963) (discussing use of the
benefit-offset principle to help finance highway construction). This insight was also at the
core of social reformer Henry George's single tax proposal. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND
POVERTY 401-05 (1879). C. Ford Runge, a professor of applied'economics, has just completed
a comprehensive empirical study of the positive and negative wealth effects of government
action. C. Ford Runge et al., Government Actions Affecting Land and Property Values: An
,Empirical Review of Takings and Givings 65-66 (Jan. 23, 1995) (draft on file with author).
12 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C.K. Ogden ed. & Richard Hildreth
trans., 1931), quoted in Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian
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"I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except
through the promise of the law which guarantees it to me.... It is only through
the protection of law that I am able to inclose a field, and to give myself up to
its cultivation with the sure though distant hope of harvest."3
I. INTRODUCTION
The quotations that begin this Lecture summarize the relationship be-
tween property as a social artifact and law. I hope that the following dis-
cussion will more fully explicate that relationship and why it is
misunderstood.
This lecture is divided into three parts. First, I will outline a critique
of efficiency as it has functioned as the metanarrative underlying our basic
,current understanding of social institutions. A metanarrative is merely a
legitimating background story rooted in the claim that it is the "story that
can reveal the meaning of all stories."4 The claim I am making is that the
standards of efficiency in common usage have operated in this way in
questions of social policy.5 For government institutions, this is summed up
in the popular claim of politicians that they will "run government like a
business." The forgotten correlative is, of course, ,that government deci-
sionmaking always involves issues of fairness as well as efficiency.
Second, drawing on this analysis, I will illustrate the political tech-
nique of the property rights advocates. This technique involves telling a
story about property rights that personalizes and humanizes a drama in
which the major characters include a big, impersonal government running
out of control, and small, relatively powerless owners of private property.
I also hope to reveal how this is a-story in which the powerful are cast in
the unlikely role of victim. Here the story is how the successful, those who
win in the market, are ruined by that gang of losers, the government. I will
illustrate how this narrative construction defines certain arguments as,
out-of-bounds by limiting considerations of fairness to the effects of gov-
ernment decisionmaking on the current possessors of property.
Third, I will review the law on these issues to reveal the sources of
the discontent and to examine the extent to which the evolution of the
doctrine supports the claims of the property rights advocates. Here I will
show that the issues are not trivial and are not just about wealth, but
rather go to the heart of who we think we are as a people. That is precisely
why this discussion matters.
Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25
ENVTL. L. 171, 182 (1995).
3 BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 112, quoted in Blumm, supra note 2, at 182 n.84.
4 BIL READINGS, INTRODUCING LYoTARD: ART AND POLrrTcs 63 (1991).
5 Pope John Paul II has noted and criticized this phenomenon. JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL
OF LiFE (Evangelium Vitae): On the Value and Inviolability of Human Life 22, 27, 40-42
(1995).
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II. A CRITIQUE OF EFFICIENCY
The definition of efficiency that dominates policy debate, at least at
the nonspecialist level, is too narrow. The definition is too narrow to the
extent that a focus on Pareto-optimality6 or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 7 ex-
cludes other important values. These other values (like species protection
or historical preservation, for example) are marginalized or excluded alto-
gether because they cannot be assessed according to the metric that effi-
ciency criteria require.8 This argument suggests that a debate over how
well social institutions function has a narrative structure organized around
two norms: the current distribution of wealth and revealed market-based
preferences. To criticize these two norms I make two points, one obvious
and the other more problematic.
First, the misnamed property rights revolution is predicated on an ef-
fort to freeze in place the existing distribution of wealth. One way to
achieve this goal is to define the existing distribution of rights and liabili-
ties as part of the total wealth held by individuals. Thus, any regulation
that rearranges the distribution of rights and liabilities can be understood
as a redistribution of wealth. This treats common-law arrangements as en-
titlements, rather than merely the result of social contests mediated
through legal institutions. In the context of the debate over regulatory tak-
ings, the ultimate effect of this conception is to frame the police power by
common-law nuisance doctrine. Yet this leads the so-called property rights
6 A Pareto-optimal position.is the state in which no possible change in position would
make one party better off without making another party worse off. An action, such as a rule
change or a voluntary transaction, might be described as Pareto-superior when it leaves one
party better off and no one worse off. By definition, all transactions voluntarily undertaken
are Pareto-superior. A Pareto-optimal state is merely the result of Pareto-superior transac-
tions. See generally Dean J. Misczynski, Efficiency and Equity, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUrS,
supra note 1, at 142, 143-46.
7 This efficiency criterion is similar to Pareto-superiority in that it posits that the result
of a transaction would leave the winners able to compensate the losers without sacrificing
all of their gains. Obviously, one important difference is that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rules
are not predicated on voluntary transactions and do not require actual compensation to the
losers. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 200-01.
8 The problem of assessing values that do not have readily accessible market prices has
spawned much literature in economics. This literature is especially rich in the cofitext of
environmental resources. See, e.g., Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation
Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction,
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029 (1995); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of Environ-
mental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DuKE L.J. 879
(1994).
Fischel, in his review of takings jurisprudence and economic critiques of the legal
doctrine, described this limitation: "[Tihe issue involves fairness as well as efficiency. Econ-
omists are uncomfortable with fairness issues and the concept of demoralization costs, be-
cause they seem so mushy.... [W]e have no obvious metric for them." FSCHEL, supra note
1, at 216-17. As this Lecture demonstrates, the application of a single metric to all decisions
and decision-making processes ignores the complex issues of governance by attempting to
force them into a single class of actions. As Fischel notes, "a self-governing people has to
decide about taldngs and related wealth-distribution issues through the institutions that it
creates." Id. at 217.
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advocates to base their claims "on a radical premise that has never been a
part of our law or tradition: that a private property owner has the absolute
right to the greatest possible profit from that property, regardless of the
consequences of the proposed use on other individuals or the public gen-
erally." 9 This point is more or less obvious.
Second, and less obvious, is the effort to hold public and private insti-
tutions to the same standard of narrow efficiency, defined provisionally
here as profit maximization. This effort ignores the fundamental differ-
ences between governance and production. Property rights advocates
want to stop government from acting- in ways that promote the general
welfare, where welfare cannot be measured as an increase in the dollar
value of social relations. o
These two observations lead inexorably to the normative question:
What kind of society do we want? Understanding constitutional limita-
tions on the power of the government to regulate private commercial be-
havior, especially where those regulations frustrate an economic
opportunity related to real property, is central to mapping the relationship
between the individual, state, and society. The distinction between the
state and civil society is old" and has come under both recent criticism
and renewed support as a descriptive and analytic matter.12 Recent analy-
ses of the forces that led to the collapse of communism in Eastern and
Central Europe 13 clarify~the problems associated with confusing the insti-
tutions of the state with those of civil society. Yet much of the recent com-
mentary on property rights is notable principally because it mistakenly,
9 Environment Regulations and Property Rights, 1995: Oversight Hearings on Pro-
posals to Supplement the Legal Framework for Private Property Interests, with Primary
Emphasis on the Operation of Federal Environmental Laws Before the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works (June 27, 1995) (testimony of John R. Schmidt, Associate
'Attorney, Department of Justice), available in WESTLAW, Federal Materials Library, US-
TESTIMONY File, 1995 WL 379304, at *2.10 Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation, Market Norms,
and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L. REV. 365, 384-85 (1995).
11 See, e.g., Blummi, supra note 2, at 196 (citing other additional sources). There is also a
large school of liberal theorists who rely on this distinction. See, e.g., SHELDON S. WOLIN,
PotrIcs AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLrrICAL THOUGHT (1960)
(maintaining the importance of nonstate social organization); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 321 (1983) (arguing that "what a larger conception of justice requires is not that
citizens rule and are ruled in turn, but that they rule in one sphere and are ruled in another");
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Curt J. Ducasse et al. eds., 1947) (discussing
the necessity of surrendering aspects of self to construct a larger governing whole, but re-
jecting the identity of state and society). There is also a pre-Leninist Marxist tradition that
relies on this distinction. See KARL MARx, SELECTED WRITINGS IN SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL PHILOSO-
PHn 218-21, 233-36 (T.B. Bottomore & Maximilien Rubel eds., 1956).
12 See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPER-
rry (1995) (describing intermediate institutions and their importance in mediating the rela-
tionship between the individual and the state); see also JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY
ON TRIAL 62 (1995) ("To survive, a richly complex private sphere requires freedom from an
all-encompassing public imperative.").
13 David Ost, Solidarity and Public Space in Poland: From Civil Society to Bourgeois
Society, Presentation of Paper at Annenberg Scholars Program Conference on Public Space
3-4 (Mar. 1-4, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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evaluates public and private institutions using identical criteria. What is
worse, much of that same commentary misunderstands the relationship
between public and private institutions and thus comes to conclusions
about how the state ought to act that are entirely mistaken.
A constitutional order designed to ensure nothing more than an atom-
ized citizenry can scarcely be said to provide the basis for a representative
government. Yet, that is what some of the so-called property rights advo-
cates are seeking to create. The rhetoric of these advocates indicates a
willful ignorance of the social function of property: to bind us together as
a society and culture, as well as to provide the basis for the maximal indi-
vidual exclusion of others.14 To see property's exclusionary role as its
principal function is to misunderstand that property rights have always
created webs of responsibility between owners and nonowners. 15 At its
most basic, this function is described in the Latin phrase sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non laedas (one should so use his property as not to injure the
rights of others). This maxim describes an immediate, substantial, and ba-
sic limit on property rights. 16 The absolutism at the heart of the popular
expression of the modem property rights movement was never part of the
jural relations described by the law of property. The evolution from a pre-
capitalist conception of property rights is the story of the increased com-
modification of realty and the extension of similar claims to various forms
of personalty and intangibles, but it is not the story of an enlarging con-
ception of absolute dominium. This story might be understood as an adap-
tation of the law to changed economic relations and an accommodation to
slowly evolving expectations of property owners. But those expectations
were always bounded by the expectations of others. The history of prop-
erty rights in this country reflects this community regarding function 17 but
has been largely forgotten or ignored in the current debate.' 8
14 The limitations on the right to exclude found both in the public accommodations laws
and in the common-law limitations are examples of just this impulse. See Joseph William
Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1996)..
15 Id.; see also MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1977)
(describing the evolving notions of feciprocal rights and duties between landowners); S.F.C.
MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 88-89 (1969) (describing the network
of relations that lay at the core of the concept of propefty as it emerged from the feudal era
and distinguishing the concept of "dominium" from our sense of commodity ownership).
16 HoRwrrz, supra note 15, at 32-33; see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971) [hereinafter Sax, Private Property] (describ-
ing the ways in which property use and value are tied to the uses that others make of their
property).
17 Hoiwrrz, supra note 15, at 47-62 (describing the transformation of doctrine reflecting
the exigencies of the era); see also Sax, Private Property, supra note 16, at 155-161 (describ-
ing the concept of public rights); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36 (1964) [hereinafter Sax, Police Power] (analyzing the traditional approaches to distin-
guish takings from police power regulations and proposing a more fruitful approach).
18 See Sax, Police Power, supra note 17, at 39 (focusing on the government's arbitral role
in adjudicating disputes between property owners); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036-37 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); William M. Treanor, The Origins
19961
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Whatever value efficiency criteria have for assessing private institu-
tions, they do not have the same value for public institutions, but instead
perform an ideological function aimed at restructuring the idea of govern-
ance. Similarly,,the claim of the absolute nature of property rights.is pri-
marily a claim about the legitimacy of government to act in other than the
most narrow and limited way. A decade ago, Professor Richard Epstein
provided the philosophical carapace for the political fight' 9 which then
had the Sagebrush Rebellion as its nom de guerre.20 Epstein was princi-
pally concerned with articulating the constitutional basis for controlling
the problem of all majoritarian democratic systems: political domination
by the majority and legislative self-dealing. He asked the questions: Has
state power been captured and used for ends other than expanding total
social wealth? and Is the state using the power to regulate or the power to
condemn to add to its own resource base (is it appropriating the surplus
of any regulatory scheme)? 2 ' According to Epstein, yes to either of these
questions means the state has exceeded the legitimate boundaries of its
authority.22
Many critical reviews of Epstein's book misunderstood its founda-
tional importance. 23 Professor Epstein correctly identified the struggle
and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94
YALE L.J. 694, 697 n.9 (1985).
19 See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 19.
20 See R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBEL-
LION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1993) (examining the roots of, the public lands contro-
versy and explaining their emotional appeal); see also Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property
Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS 1, 3 (Bruce Yandle
ed., 1995) (capturing the history of the movement and the evolution of the Sagebrush Rebel-
lion into the Wise Use Movement). Marzulla describes the genesis of the Wise Use
Movement:
The Sagebrush Rebellion was spreading like wildfire across the West. From Nevada
through Utah, Wyoming, and Montana, people were growing frustrated with the fed-
eral government's opposition to resource development in their region.... One na-
tional newspaper noted "a diffuse and ill-focused feeling of uneasiness,
powerlessness, and anger that cuts through political and socioeconomic boundaries"
among residents of the region.
The first people to actively organize against the government were those depen-
dent on federal lands for their livelihoods. Landowners being closed out of the pro-
ductive use of their lands included farmers, ranchers, miners, loggers, and
"inholders"-those with property bordering or surrounded by federal land.... Trade
associations representing each of these interest groups (such as the National Cattle-
men's Association) fought specific regulations, but there was no real "network" con-
necting the organizations. The establishment of broader organizations like the Center
for the Defense of Free Enterprise, National Inholders Association (now the Ameri-
can Land Rights Association), and People for the West! in the mid 1970s created a
common network, and a name-the "Wise Use" movement.
Id. at 4-5 (footnote omitted) (quoting David F. Salisbury, Energy: The Varmint That May
Spoil America's West, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR (Midwestern Edition), Sept. 3, 1981, at B26).
21 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 112, 126-28.
22 Id.
23 For an example of a review that noted the importance of Epstein's work, see Joseph L.
Sax, Richard Epstein, Takings, Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 53 U.
CG. L. REV. 279 (1986) (book review).
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over property rights as the grounds upon which issues of our social archi-
tecture would be fought, much in the way that the Due 'Process and Equal
Protection Clauses provided the grounds for similar struggles a generation
earlier.24 Epstein hinges his theory of takings on the constitutional prereq-
uisites for a theory of limited representative government. At its core, the
constitutional theory that legitimizes the government itself also protects
property rights by limiting the reach of the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity. He would, in essence, make every governmental action subject to
common-law tort analysis and expand governmental liability to include
those actions that have traditionally been considered legitimate regulatory
exercises of the police power. 25 Epstein's theory does not just modify the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, his theory eliminates it.26 The Takings
Clause,27 according to Epstein's view, merely enacts common-law nui-
sance and trespass standards into the Constitution.28 Because, in his the-
ory of representative government, the state has only those rights that the
people have, it is allowed to exercise the police power only to prevent
harm or to arrange affairs to achieve a Pareto-superior result where the
problems associated with large scale voluntary transactions make such a
result unlikely.29 While I disagree with Epstein's conclusions, I believe that
in many ways his focus is correct. I too want to concentrate on concep-
tions of power, value, and right and to reject the crabbed vision of social
life that Epstein, the Sagebrush rebellion, and its progeny see as the future
for this country.
This grass-roots movement has its academic analog. The ascendancy
of the rhetoric of law and economics has led to importation of public
choice and game theory into legal analysis. While that literature has con-
tributed many important insights into the evolution of law and democratic
processes,30 it produces an odd kind of tunnel vision when it becomes
prescriptive.31 Part of the problem is that it adopts a particular metric, that
of revealed preferences through market exchange or* its methodological
equivalent, that masks a range of problems when applied to nonmarket
circumstances 3 2 Social complexity and a democratic commitment to pro-
24 See Marzulla, supra note 20, at 3 ("The property rights movement is to the 1990s what
the civil rights movement was to the 1960s.").
25 EPSTEIN, supra note, 1, at 35-56.
26 Id. at 44.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRiCKE, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRO-
DUCTION 132 (1991).
31 See Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REv. 451 (1974); FIscHEL, supra note 1, at 217.
32 See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 49 (1988) (arguing that the economic
conception of environmental values is too narrow to provide an accurate assessment of all
the normative questions posed by issues of environmental quality); Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 986 n.101 (1982) (discussing the difficulty of
distinguishing market "inalienability rules" from "property rules" and the implication of the
1996]
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tect the varieties of ways people value social goods require that political
and social institutions designed to sustain diverse values be free to struc-
ture their normative visions in ways consistent with their own ends.3 3 Re-
quiring that every institutional judgment conform to a specific standard
produces distortions in policy to the extent that it requires the institutions
of governance to mimic the institutions of the market. The institutions of
the state presumably exist to effect the allocation of social goods for
which there is no clear market, nor even a reasonable market substitute,
and for which there is continuing contestation over the conceptions of
"the good" that justifies the institution itself.
Value is a critical conception in this contest. What it is, how it is cre-
ated, and how it is measured are of central importance. While the rhetoric
of market value .(sometimes phrased as use value or exchange value,
although these terms have diverse and at times opposed pedigrees) has
dominated the debate, that conception of what something is worth should
not divert our attention from other struggles over things we think impor-
tant. As Professor Jack Balkin has pointed out, one of the central aspects
of our humanity is our propensity and capacity to value, to assess, and to
weigh. 34 Freedom, community, and neighborliness are also Values; that is,
we think that the particular aspects of social life summarized by those
words are important and we would not sacrifice them without getting
something equally important in return. Yet even here, the language of ex-
change should not obscure the truth that there is no objective calculus for
those things, no metric or system of bargain that relieves us of the obliga-
tion to make normative judgments.3 5 As I discuss the evolution of the
property rights debate, part of my argument hinges on the conception of
value that has dominated the debate. This is important because the effort
to impose a single evaluative criteria on the consequences of public and
private action leads us to focus on the wrong questions.
The political technique used to accomplish this redefinition of value
separate from values has been to tell a story about property rights. This
story personalizes and humanizes the dispute over government regulations
of private property by casting the story in terms of a generalized govern-
ment attack on private property. The state is seen not as the insurer of
private property, but its destroyer. In essence:, it is a man bites dog story.
The powerful are cast in the role of the victim. They have captured the
current fascination with victimology and structured their story around it.
Thus, the rhetorical tropes have played on the notion of the individual
against the state by using the symbol of the government as'something
alien from us. Instead of asking the more obvious question: how might we
restructure the system of governance to be more responsive to the desires
of the people, the rhetorical reflex is to define the actions that are taken in
nature of contract, because both contract and property may be perceived as based on
personhood).
33 See WALZER, supra note 11, at 216; Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separa-
tion,' 12 POL THEoRY 315, 327-29 (1984) [hereinafter Walzer, Liberalism].
34 J.M. Balldn, Ideology as Cultural Software, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1224-25 (1995).
35 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1190 (1985).
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our name as illegitimate. By raising the claim of illegitimacy, the debate is
transformed and the property owner taking up the mantle of victim is
more honorable, because he does so not in his own name, but in the name
of the people. Seen this way, this is not the story of mere venality; instead,
it is the story of patriotic struggle. Much of the debate that surrounds
property rights today is heated, highly' ideological, or hyper-technical.
Each side wants to give simple answers to fiercely knotted questions. Yet
mere desire does not create effective politics, even less does it provide a
sufficient foundation for sound legal argument.
Despite the various technical iterations, the basic arguments of the
so-called property rights advocates run this way:
1) Property ownership is tied to political power. The right to own
real property is, in fact, the basic right. It undergirds all civil rights and
civil liberties.
2) The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion directly limits the power of the state to expropriate private property
unless those owners are compensated at the unregulated exchange value
of the property.
3) Because of this limitation, the state is using regulation to achieve
without compensation what the Constitution would prohibit if the govern-
ment acted directly.
4) This move is a deliberate attempt to expand the power of the state
at the expense of property owners and to the detriment of all citizens.
5) The regulatory zeal of the state "makes enemies of the majority of
Americans"3 6 and is part of the mistaken belief that the government can
do things better than people can.
6) Any government action that limits development potential of real
property, where that action is not aimed at preventing an immediate pub-
lic harm, is a compensable taking. Compensation is required regardless of
the value left in the parcel after the regulation is enacted or the reciprocal
benefit conferred by the limitation.
7.) The environmental motivation behind much of the regulation of
private property is antihuman.3 7
These arguments combine into a story about government that sug-
gests the government is separated from the people and does not represent
the public interest in any coherent way-especially because it makes
claims in the interest of the public that we could not make against our
neighbors. All of the state actions that feel oppressive are attributable to
the capture by the central government of most of the political power in
our society and the parallel capture of the central government by collectiv-
ist special interests.
36 See Marzulla, supra note 20, at 26 ("The environmental ethic denies the natural human
impulse to own things and protect one's right to ownership as well as shuts out and makes
enemies of the majority of Americans.").
37 This rather incredible claim is made in Nancie Marzulla's article, supra note 20, at 24-
1996]
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Confronting the arguments in play in the current debate leads to the
following questions: What is the basis for the so-called property rights
revolution? How have its proponents been able to weave a socially and
legally compelling story? How is that story tied up with the general antipa-
thy to government, yet consistent with restrictive systems of private social
control? Professor Carol Rose suggests that attention to just these issues
is central to understanding the ways in which various heuristic devices are
transformed into normative positions.3 8 The political argument then pro-
ceeds from the normative, forgetting that the "principle at stake" is as
much a narrative principle as a traditional doctrinal ' value. We can see a
political argument that claims to be grounded in principle for the story
that it is, yet this does not mean the restatement of the story cannot pro-
duce a way of understanding the normative debate that precludes some
argumentsfrom the debate. It is not enough to say of a particular formula-
tion that it is merely one way of telling the story, especially when a partic-
ular narrative has popular political resonance. The political power of a
particular story delegitimizes other explanations and viewpoints, and
structures the form of political and legal contestation.39
The Sagebrush Rebellion, for example, began with the cry that federal
land should "revert" to the states and their citizens. The idea of reversion
has both a vernacular and technical valence. The two meanings are deeply
at odds. The popular meaning of reversion is "give us back what rightfully
belongs to us." The technical meaning appears similar, yet is critically dif-
ferent. For property to revert, the claimant must be vested with an interest
that arose prior to the claims of the current claimants. If a technical rever-
sionary interest existed, then release of the current possessory interest
would cause the land -to "go back" to the original owner (or her heirs).
Thus, with that simple exclamation, the "Sagebrush Rebels" asserted a rev-
olutionary idea: that the federal government had no constitutional claim to
the, land it was administering and thus the current occupiers were the le-gitimate heirs to the fee interest.40 Of course, this claim conveniently for-
gets the story of how and when the current occupiers came to be the
current occupiers-a story that may be told by the history of Native Amer-
icans and Mexican land grants.41 Also, by asserting a form of constitu-
38 Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990).
39 See ALAN GARFIN'KEL, FORMS OF EXPLANATION (1981) (discussing how explanations re-
late to one another and to questions); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yon-
nondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 628
(1990).
40 See United States v. Nye County, Nevada, No. CVS-95-002322 (D. Nev. 1995) (ified Mar.
6, 1995) (case filed in U.S. district court challenging state statute that presumed to assume
state and local jurisdiction over federal lands); see also Erik Larson, Unrest in the West,
TIME, Oct. 23, 1995, at 52 (reporting on the land conflicts that are the subject of United
States v. Nye County).
41 See, e.g., RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SuRvivAL: A POPULATION
HISTORY SINCE 1492 (1987) (chronicling the decline in the physical population of the Ameri-
can Indian, discussing in particular the geographic removal of Indian people from their terri-
tories). John Swanton describes the same phenomena in a straightforward ethnographic
[Vol, 26:1
TAKING AND GIVING
tional argument by reference to the "equal footing" doctrine, the western
states are making a claim of entitlement status equivalent to the states of
the eastern seaboard. The adoption of reversion as the foundation of their
normative claim asserts a dignitary harm of the following type: "We in the
West ought to be treated with the same constitutional respect as the origi-
nal colonial states and we cannot achieve that because of the heavy hand
of federal ownership of 'our' land base." Thus, it is not only small land
owners who are the victims, but the entire West. The warning is that un-
less the federal government is controlled, the rest of the country will suf-
fer the same fate.42
Controlling the stream of experience requires that we create ways of
understanding it. Recognizing the didactic strategy of the narrative of the
property rights revolt is important to understanding its persuasive effect.
In this context, the narrative structure of the well-told story includes a
history of government and the sources of its legitimacy. 43 How we catego-
rize the data of social life into events or phenomena, analytic categories,
or narrative structures helps to determine the meaning of those data and
give them, among other things, a political and legal valence. By casting the
story of property rights as a revolt against "big" government, the early pro-
ponents were able to turn a simple resource allocation decision that was
made in the nineteenth century into the foundation for current oppression
of the underrepresented small property owner. Importantly, they were
also able to pit the West against the East. The sectional injustice is located
in the fact that the foundational states of the Union were able to enter the
Union without any federal ownership claim to their territory.44 Using ele-
ments of persuasive, exemplary, and authoritarian didacticism,4 5 the most
vocal advocates of the Sagebrush Rebellion were able to turn a states'
taxonomy of the North American Indians. See JOHN R. SWANTON, THE INDIAN TRIBES OF NORTH
AMERICA (1952). Much of the West was not "open territory." If not claimed by Indian peoples,
it was claimed by citizens who derived their title from grants from Spain or Mexico. Malcolm
Ebright, New Mexican Land Grants: The Legal Background, in LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HISPANIC LAND GRANTS 15, 21-26 (Charles L Briggs,& John R. Van Ness
eds., 1987). This title was promised protection in the Protocols of Queretaro that was
adopted prior to the complete ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The-Protocol
stated "that the United States did not intend to annul legitimate grants.... Legitimate titles
... were those that were valid under Mexican law as of the cut-off date of 13 May 1846." Id.
at 28. To the residents of the West who derive their presence from those land grants, this
disregard for the land claims that they make is not just of historical interest. Mr. Ebright
notes, "[tlo many Hispanic residents, the land grant story is not simply a fading part of New
Mexico's history., Rather it is the story of their own families, going back many generations."
Id. at 50.
42 I do not want to obscure by this formulation the real feelings of injustice that stem
from long attachments to particular land and from the sense that a deal, though always
implicit, has been rescinded.
43 See sources cited supra note 40.
44 This part of the argument forgets the debates about the status of Indian territory and
the compromises of the slave trade.
45 See DIDIER CosTE, NARATrvE As COMMUNICATION 297-333 (1989).
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rights and sectional argument into an argument for individual liberty. This
didactic strategy has occurred before in our national history.46
Yet, none of us alone completely write the stories that give coherence
to our lives and our understanding of events. As Michael Walzer, a profes-
sor of social science, puts it, "[t]he individual does not create the institu-
tions that he or she joins; nor can he or she wholly shape the obligations
he or she assumes. The individual lives in a world he or she did not
make."47 The symbols we adopt and the rhetorical figures we employ are
used because of their currency in the larger culture. Their conversion 'to
legally significant symbols, and thus into arguments and doctrines, is part
of the contest over our national history and the conception of social life
that is central to the property rights debate as it has evolved. Thus, it is
significant that the property 'rights rebellion is playing the role that the
civil rights movement played in the sixties: the role of defining who we are
and who we want to be as society and culture. The irony is that by playing
the role of oppressed outsiders, property rights advocates vindicate vast
agglomerations of private power whose authority over the individual is not
regulated according to commonly agreed-upon standards. In fact, in order
to prevail, the property rights rebels must overturn the essence of the civil
rights victories. 48
Both an analytic and moral claim are made when a movement at-
tempts to assume the mantle of the civil rights movement. The analytic
claim rests on the proposition that property rights are at the heart of both
theories of representative governance and individual liberties. The moral
claim of the property rights movement, unlike the arguments of civil rights,
activists for both formal and substantive equality that were rooted in the
language of the Civil War Amendments and centuries-old history of racial
subordination, is murlder and harder to state. The basic moral claim is
that the voluntary distribution of social goods reflects the optimum ex-
pression of individual choice. So long as no goods were obtained through
force or fraud, there is no justification, save prevention of harm, for inter-
fering with those private preferences. As an abstract matter, the moral
claim is relatively strong. As an empirical claim it is somewhat weaker.
This is especially true if time is not discounted and historical claims of
fraud and force are preserved.
The baseline proposition that the law exists to protect and defend the
existing distribution of wealth requires that the distribution of legal enti-
46 For example, this didactic strategy appeared in the pre-Civil War debate, the constitu-
tional convefition debates over the appropriate structure and distribution of power between
the states and the central government (federalism versus anti-federalism), the Dixiecrat ar-
guments in the 1940s, and now in the debates over the Republicans' Contract with America.
47 Walzer, Liberalism, supra note 33, at 324.
48 See, e.g., Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Symposium, The
New Property and the Individual-25 Years Later, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 221 (1990). These arti-
cles capture the extent to which property functions as a defense to government excesses but
also limits the extent to which the government may extend and deny largesse. The essence
of the civil rights victories lies in the recognition that there are limits to both private and
public power based on the core normative-claims of democracy
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tlements also be included as part of the "protected wealth." The existing
wealth distribution pattern can be interrogated from a number of perspec-
tives. It is a commonplace that the distribution of rights and liabilities is
part of the distribution of wealth.49 Thus, rather than accepting the prem-
ise that any deviation from the existing distribution pattern ought to be
suspect, the analysis ought to begin with a critique of the existing pattern
of distribution. Only upon a finding that the distribution conforms with
our background principles of justice (even those proposed by Professor
Epstein) should the question of whether a deviation from the existing pat-
tern is permissible be considered 50 Certainly, the principles against self-
dealing legislatures (however constituted) ought to require that analysis.
Otherwise, patterns that are predicated on the existing distribution merely
replicate the sin of nonrepresentative special interest capture of the state.
With these arguments in mind, when aspects of government action
create wealth (especially wealth created as a byproduct of some police
power function of government), the "giving" part of the "taking and giving"
argument is only one aspect of the justice claim that underlies the argu-
ment for a broader understanding of the wealth effects of government ac-
tion. While the justice claim is essential to understanding the complex
nature of both obligations and effects of governance and may, in itself, be
sufficient to answer the arguments for limiting the police power and the
regulatory reach of government by analogizing them to the actions of pri-
vate actors, there is a more compelling reason to reject that analysis. Un-
less there is a clear demarcation of institutional functions, the government
and the powers of government merely become the mirrors of the distribu-
tion of private economic power with no principled basis for dissenting
from that model absent some theory of institutional capture. The elevation
of the extant distribution of entitlements and liabilities to a matter of prin-
ciple is critical to the moral claim outline above. The answer to the risk of
capture objection is to assert that the principles of private property are
embedded in the Constitution, and to claim that their very embeddedness
would preclude any dictatorial abuse of power by clearly spelling out the
limitations of governmental action-except that, in fact, the mirror is re-
quired by our constitutional commitment to a representative government.
Yet if this is true, then the condemnation of every majoritarian decision
that rearranges pre-existing property rights is required. Such decisions are
viewed as naked power grabs, without considering whether the arbitral
function the government serves is appropriate or whether the government
is merely adding to its own resource base. The anti-majoritarian theory, in
effect, lacks a sufficient theory of the state.
III. ,THE CURRENT STATE OF TAIGNGS JURISPRUDENCE
The assault on the proper functions of government that has been un-
dertaken by the so-called property rights movement has not occurred in a
49 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv: 1089, 1098-99 (1972).
50 See ROBERT NOZicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153-74 (1974).
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vacuum. The legal and philosophical claims must be understood against
the background of, takings jurisprudence and the dominant models that
have guided that type of adjudication. This Part will examine the law of
takings and determine the status of contemporary takings jurisprudence
and, in the process, assess the impact of the property rights movement.
The property rights movement has already had a major impact on public
policy discourse, but what is its impact on the law?
The basic understanding of the Takings Clause is simple. The state
may not dispossess a property owner of his property unless it does so to
achieve a public purpose and pays the property owner the market value of
the property that the state has taken. The test that the courts apply to
adjudge the constitutionality of a particular action is to inquire whether
the action is justified by the police power and whether adequate compen-
sation has been paid. That is the easy part. The hard part is where the
state acts to limit the range of activities a property owner may undertake
with her property, but does not actually take possession of the property.
The problem is especially acute when the regulation can be shown to have
diminished the exchange value of the property in some marked way.
There is no doubt that the state may regulate the uses of private prop-
erty.51 This may be done either through the imposition of a court order
resolving a private. dispute or through a general legislative message
designed to minimize private disputes or achieve a democratically deter-
mined public goal. The regulation is limited by the police power and, ex-
cept in the case of nuisance, if the regulation eliminates all economic uses
of the property, the state must typically pay compensation. But what if the
regulation does not totally devalue the subject property, but merely dimin-
ishes the exchange value of the property by totally eliminating the value of
one aspect of ownership? Is compensation required? The answer has typi-
cally been no, but those situations are at the heart of the property, rights
movement. Environmental regulations have been viewed as the principal
culprit in charges of government overreaching. What is wrong with the
conventional view?,
Property rights advocates answer that the conventional view misun-
derstands both the true constitutional limitations on the exercise of the
police power as well as the proper constitutional conception of the effects
of state action on property rights. Their view runs roughly as follows: The
Constitution requires that property be understood as a bundle of rights,
each one a part of the value of the whole, but valuable in itself. When the
value of any one of the rights in the bundle is eliminated the state must
compensate the property owner for the loss of the value of the right re-
gardless of the remaining value of the whole parcel. By adopting some
version of the diminution of value analysis, modem takings analysis has
corrupted this understanding and has led to a loss of constitutional dignity
51 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-19 (1992); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987); Penn Central TYansp.
Co. v. Now York City, 438 U.S. 104,129 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922).
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for property rights. Moreover, the state may only regulate private property
if it is eliminating what would be a nuisance under common law or where
the regulation produces a Pareto-optimal result based upon the extant dis-
tribution of wealth. Who is right?
One point conceded by all is that when a regulation produces "an
average reciprocity of benefit," no compensation is required.52 Even Ep-
stein agrees with this. He would merely require a more searching and indi-
viduated inquiry and would have the reciprocal advantage analysis limited
by a dollar-for-dollar balance. This is a form of the takings and givings
argument.53 The idea of balancing value is well established in our law.
54
The easiest place to find this analog is in the theory of set-off in commer-
cial and bankruptcy law.55 Remember that the Court in Agins v. City of
Tiburon5 6 used a "reciprocity of advantage" argument that was in the na-
ture of a set-off to justify the restrictions on the property owners. 57 That
argument only comes into play, however, when there are well-established
rights that are in question. That is the meaning of the distinct investment-
backed expectation test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.58 Commercial law does not count inchoate possibilities, nor does the
common law value contingent interests.59
In 1964, Professor Joseph Sax published an article in the Yale Law
Journal that attempted to construct a framework for making a principled
distinction among the varieties of actions that government undertakes that
have a negative impact on private land Value. 60 In determining which ac-
tions produce a compensable event, Sax argued that it was important to
first consider the nature of the governmental action.6 1 In his analysis, the
principal division between types of governmental action can be found
when the government is acting in a way that merely aggrandizes its own
position in relation to private actors compared to when it is arbitrating
disputes between private actors.6 2 The police power is constrained by the
arbitral role that the state plays.63 The government may act through the
52 Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a
New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 Am. U. L. REV. 297, 301 (1990).
53 See sources cited supra note 1. While there are powerful economic data to justify
such an inquiry, it would in practice "introduce yet another layer of governmental interfer-
ence and uncertainty to cloud the valuations given in the market. This further incursion of
public or judicial judgment on market processes is, ironically, precisely what advocates of
wider compensation for takings seem most to abhor." Runge et al., supra note 1, at 66.
54 See Coletta, supra note 52, at 360-64; sources cited supra note 1.
55 Randall L. Dunn, Banker's Lien and Equitable Setoff. Constititutional and Policy
Consideration for Protecting Bank Customers, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1152-53 (1975).
56 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
57 Id. at 262 ("The zoning ordinances benefit ... [the property owners] as well as the
public .... [The property owners] therefore will share with other owners the benefits and
burdens of the city's exercise of its police power.").
58 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
59 See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 85.15 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
60 Sax, Police Power, supra note 17,.at 36.
61 Id. at 62.
62 Id. at 62-64.
63 Ad. at 64.
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adjudication of individual disputes or may legislate generally, achieving
the same results that would occur by the mere accumulation of the resolu-
tion of individual disputes. That this is a normative process is understood.
The Takings Clause is a limitation on the police power to the extent that it
prevents majority self-dealing in the guise, of dispute resolution through
regulation or legislation.64 The 1964 article, despite Sax's subsequent res-
ervations concerning the analysis,65 is fundamentally important because
of the contribution it makes toward a fullerunderstanding of the proper
demarcation of institutional functions that is critical for appreciating the
distinct roles that the state plays. The article's sophisticated understand-
ing of state roles prevents the confusion of the state's function with that of
other market participants or the institutions of civil society. By clearly
outlining that distinction and working through the implications for the ex-
ercise of the police power, the ground can be cleared for an assessment of
when it makes sense to compensate diminished expectations even if it is
not constitutionally required. Unlike the modern advocates for limiting
governmental activity through the Takings Clause, the careful analysis of
decision-types asks a more sensible question about whether it is a good
policy to use the uncompensated police power regulation to achieve a par-
ticular policy end.
Professor Frank Michelman, in his justly celebrated article 6 6 fol-
lowed a similar insight and outlined a utilitarian approach to calculating
when compensation would, as a matter of policy, be required. According
to Michelman, compensation is required when demoralization costs ex-
ceed efficiency gains and settlement costs. 67 Efficiency gains are "the ex-
cess of benefits produced by a measure over the losses inflicted by it."68
Demoralization costs are
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to
the losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no com-
pensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future
production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observ-
ers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar
treatment .... "Settlement costs" are measured by the dollar value of the time,
effort, and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation
settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs. 69
This standard, when combined with the arbitral approach proposed'
by Sax in his 1964 article,7 0 limits the power of government in important
ways. However, the limits do not arbitrarily prevent legislatures from en-
64 Id. at 64-67.
65 Sax, Private Property, supra, note 16, at 150.
66 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Hnv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
67 Id. at 1215.
68 Id. at 1214.
69 Id. (footnote omitted).
70 See Sax, Police Power, supra note 17, at 63; Sax, Private Property, supra note 16, at
151-55.
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acting laws for the public interest. Even the majority in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council7' admitted that restricting the police power to
enforcing claims that arise either within the context'of common-law nui-
sance or common-pool problems is to use substantive due process in a
way that brutally circumscribes the legislative power and the democratic
capacity of the state to say what the public interest is.72 The early cases
that suggest that no regulation can constitute a taking 3 seem right to this
extent: the police power is not limited to securing the public from some
nuisance-like harm. The Takings Clause was designed to prevent the gov-
ernment from localizing all of the burdens of a particular public policy.
But this is a very different concern from whether the common-law bound-
aries of nuisance law describe the constitutional boundaries of the police
power. This particular limitation on the exercise of the police power is
sumnmed up by both Professors Michelman and Sax Where, under some
theory of capture; the state is operating like a private scavenging company
on behalf of the politically powerful as against the politically weak, it
seems relatively easy to use the limitation of the police power to invalidate
a particular action. 4 Merely because there is some ancillary private bene-
fit, however, is not proof of constitutional corruption and may only occa-
sion more searching judicial inquiry. It may only be evidence of the
wealth-creating aspects of regulation.
The idea of partial takings, outside of the context of actual physical
occupation, is quite perplexing. Because the argument for compensation is
predicated upon the fact that property interests are capable of being seg-
mented, what principle determines which loss will require compensation?
This argument, taken to the extreme, potentially turns every regulatory
action into a compensable event. Legislation undertaken to foreclose pri-
vate disputes is not immune from the inquiry, which now would go beyond
questions of majoritarian rent-seeking. If each segmentable property inter-
est is subject to takings review, what are the appropriate limits to the con-
sideration of novel interests? Surely, the law would not in this instance be
limited to old common-law interests. As Professor S.F.C. Milsom demon-
strated, the history of the common law has largely been the history of the
abuse of its fundamental principles generated by the novelty of the prac-
ticing lawyer."5 What are the appropriate limitations to the legal imagina-
tion? If the lawyer's mind can conceive of a new way to cut a particular
parcel., is each new idea-a protectable interest? Of course, the answer is
71 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
72 Id. at 1022-26 (stating that a legislative determination of a noxious-use justification is
no longer determinative in regulatory takings analysis).
73 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance upheld where value
of land diminished by over 90%); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906) (no
compensation where railroad required to remove and rebuild bridge for public safety); New
Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453 (1905) (no compensation for gas
company required to move underground gas pipes for public drainage system); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 6,78 (1888) (no compensation required in wake of statute banning sale
of oleomargarine).
74 Fisctim, supra note 1, at 19-21.
75 See MLsoM, supra note 15, at 6-7.
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no, especially when the purported interest is only .of speculative value. If
this is true, doesn't this just return us to the common-law interests base-
line, now fortified'by existing regulatory decisions such that the existing
government binds successors on the basis of judgments made now? No
one accepts that principle of sovereign limitation except to the extent that
the Due Process Clause requires some regularity in the processes of gov-
ernance consistent withthe other constitutionally protected interests of
individuals.
The idea is murky largely because it is unworkable. The principal
problem is measuring the reduction in value. Are baseline common-law
rules the only possible basis for making the takings determination? If so,
then what of all regulation? Do we need to account for the value attributa-
ble to public action? If my property value increases because of public reg-
ulation (even assuming the limitations of the average reciprocity of
advantage arguments), then shouldn't any economic loss caused by new
government regulation be discounted by the corresponding value added
by the existing regulations? If the change allows my neighbor to do some-
thing that diminishes the value of my property, is that just the workings of
the market, or is it the result of government action? The question might be
rejected as spurious because the parties can always bargain and reach a
Pareto-optimal solution. However, that does not resolve the question of
whether the government is responsible for my loss. After all, the change in
a liability rule may directly cause me to have to "bribe" my neighbors to
preserve the residential quality of my neighborhood. Who should pay for
that change in my position? Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United
States,7 6 a recent decision by the Federal Circuit, presents an interesting
approach to these issues.
The reasoning in Florida Rock is deceptive because it suggests that
Lucas decided the question of whether compensation was required.7 7 The
limited holding in Lucas is inapposite to the dispute in Florida Rock. Re-
member that in Lucas the landowner purchased land without restrictions
with the expectation that he would be able to use his property to the same
extent as his neighbors.7 8 Subsequent regulation dashed those expecta-
tions and virtually reduced the economic value of his parcel to zero.79 In
Florida Rock the landowners purchased the property just before the en-
actment of the Clean Water Act. Before they began mining operations,
however, the Army Corps of Engineers adopted regulations under section
404 of the Clean Water Act that restricted dredging and filling operations
in wetlands. By the time mining operations began the landowners should
have been cognizant of the restrictions on the property and should also
have known that the economic use of the property for mining purposes
would require a permit:80 To say that the permitting process reduced the
76 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
77 Id. at 1564-65.
78 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
79 Id. at 1009, 1020.
80 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1562 (briefly reciting the chronology of events leading up
to the lawsuit).
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value of the property is to treat the market value as though it were in-
dependent of the restrictions on all similarly situated properties. This is
not a plausible construction of value, and it also elevates investment-
backed expectations, the limitation created in Penn Central,8 ' to an in-
vestment predicated upon a contingency. In Florida Rock, the contingency
was a permit. The argument in Penn Central was much more akin to the
more common vested rights limitation on uncompensated changes in gov-
ernmental permission for a private action. To so limit the permissible
range of governmental permitting processes in this way is an argument for
social paralysis and makes the public interest hostage to those who own
property, rather than to the citizens who make up the polity. It is only
slight hyperbole to suggest that this analysis is the mere reimposition of
the property requirement to the question of representation. The reasoning
in Florida Rock would turn all of regulation into fodder for an aggressive
and malignant form of the condemnation blight argument that is limited
and already well understood.8 2
The reasoning in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States8 3 is simi-
larly flawed. In that case, the plaintiffs owned land in New Jersey that they
planned to develop and sell for residential use.84 However,, some of the
land the plaintiffs aimed to develop was wetland.8 5 When the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers denied the plaintiffs a permit to develop the wetland
tracts, the plaintiffs sued for compensation for the reduction in value they
alleged was traceable to the permit denial.8 6 The plaintiffs claimed that the
government's action constituted a taking and had effectively reduced the
value of their property to zero. The trial court had found that the proposed
development site was worth $2,658,000 before the Corps denied the permit
and only $12,500 afterwards.8 7 This is a brutal reduction in value, but the
size of the "diminution" does not resolve the question of whether compen-
sation is required or whether the regulation is permissible.
he court held that with regard to the interest allegedly taken, the
Supreme Court, in Lucas and its progeny, announced the test for the exist-
ence of a regulatory taking.88 According to the court's version of -the ex-
isting jurisprudence of regulatory takings, compensation is required if
three requirements are met.8 9 First, there must be proof that all economic
use of the subject property was eliminated and the loss was the result of a
regulatory action.90 The inquiry goes to the extent of the landowner's
81 Penn Central 'fTransp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
82 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-36 (1954) (recognizing condemnation as a
valid exercise of the police power to attack the problem of urban blight on an area-wide as
opposed to structure-by-structure basis).
83 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
84 Id. at 1174.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1174-75, 1178.
88 Id. at 1178-79.
89 Id. at 1179.
90 Id.
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property affected by the permit denial.91 In the court's view, the easiest
case is when the entire tract of property is affected by the regulatory ac-
tion.9 2 The inquiry becomes increasingly more problematic depending
upon the extent of the remaining unrestricted property. 93 This construc-
tion of the appropriate judicial inquiry indicates that this court has fully
accepted the partial taking hypothesis and asserts that the latter inquiry is
whether there is a partial taking.
Second, the court looks to see if the property owner had a distinct
investment-backed expectation.94 Third,. the court must ascertain whether
this investment-backed expectation was vested in the property owner as a
matter of state property law and was not within the power of the state to
regulate as a matter of common-law nuisance doctrine.9 5 If the court de-
termines the answers to that set of inquiries are "yes," then compensation
is required. Just compensation is then determined by the formula created
in Florida Rock. In Florida Rock, the court determined that the landowner
was owed the difference between the parcel's unrestricted fair market
value before the permit was denied and the property's fair market value
after the permit was denied.96 As I suggested earlier, this determination of
value presumes that the property was purchased without any thought of
the necessity of public approval before a particular use was made of it.
Taking the court's analysis at face value would suggest that the mere exist-
ence of the regulation worked a taking. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclhmation Ass'n,97 of course, resolved that issue, 8 and economic
theory suggests that the expectation value must be based on the potential
realities of the market, not some imagined unregulated market for the
commodity in question. Moreover, in its resolution of the "denominator"
problem, the Forida Rock court merely looked at the economic impact of
the permit denial on the regulated portion of the parcel rather than the
impact on the parcel taken as a whole.99
Despite Lucas's suggestive language, the Court has never limited the
reach of the police power to the contours described by common-law nui-
sance. The Court has increasingly required a closer connection between
91 Id. at 1180.
92 Id.
93 Id. This, of course, is not a completely accurate characterization, because it is impos-
sible to find any property that is completely unrestricted; what the court means is the por-
tion, of this property not covered by this particular regulation. The court is making a
jurisdictional argument. So understood, the court's reasoning is better suited to the issue of
whether there was appropriate use of the police power in the first instance. The inswer to
that question would render the analysis of the "partial taking" claim irrelevant.
94 Id. at 1179. This issue was not disputed during the trial. Id.
95 Id. 
-
96 Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1053 (1987)).
97 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
98 Id. at 293-97 (holding that a mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmen-
tal body does not constitute a regulatory taking).
99 Forida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571-73, 1578-79.
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the proposed regulation and the desired goal to be achieved, but that is a
far cry from the limitation suggested either in Florida Rock or Loveladies
Harbor. The restriction on state action in those cases creates by negaiive
implication a theory of vested rights that gives rise to the existence of
their version 6f the "distinct investment-backed expectation" doctrine.
This analysis also creates a constitutional limitation on the exercise of the
police power that is not found in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
It is not even a very convincing extrapolation. Lucas is not the only source,
of insight into the Supreme Court's thinking on the limitations of the po-
lice power. The Court has often suggested that the limitation is not de-
fined abstractly in advance, but that a detailed factual inquiry is at the
heart of the matter. One example is Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.1° ° The essential nexus test developed in Nollan is essentially one
test of the legitimacy of the police power. There the Court noted that "a
use restriction may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial government purpose."' 0 ' By imposing the re-
quirement of a close relationship between the means and the ends, the
Court was reaffirming its commitment to the conditions of decision mak-
ing that would prevent the kinds of democratic excesses the Takings
Clause was designed to guard against.
To demonstrate the constitutional effect of the necessity of a close
connection, the Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard10 2 stressed that
the obligation to demonstrate an instrumental need for the restriction
would effectively eliminate the temptation to overreach.10 3 The constitu-
tionally required nexus, between the impact of a proposed development
and the restriction on that development is captured in the following quota-
tion from Dolan:
We think the "reasonable relationship" test adopted by a majority of the
state courts is closer to the federal conptitutional norm .... But we do not
adopt it as such, partly because the term "reasonable relationship" seems con-
fusingly similar to the term "rational basis" which describes the minimal level
of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates what we
100 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
101 Id. at 834 (quoting Penn Central 'Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978)).
102 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
103 The Dolan Court made this point in the following way:
In some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection be-
tween the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. We
think this standard is too lax to adequately protect petitioner's right to just compensa-
tion if her property is taken for a public purpose.
Other state courts require a very exacting correspondence, described as the
"specifi[c] and uniquely attributable" test.... Under this standard, if the local govern-
ment cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically
created need, the exaction becomes "a veiled exercise of the power of eminent do-
main and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations."
Id. at 2318-19 (citation omitted) (quoting Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect,
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)).
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hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized de-
termination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to
the impact of the proposed development.104
This requirement of "individualized determination" means that re-
strictions on use will be more carefully scrutinized and the power to say
no in the permitting process cannot be used to extort concessions from
landowners unrelated to the actual or cumulative impacts of their actions.
That is not a radical proposal, but merely follows the reasoning of Justice
William Brennan in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,05
that city planners, as well as police officers, ought to be able to apply the
Constitution. 106,
Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent in Dolan correctly focuses on the
impact of the exaction on the property as a whole.' 07 Moreover, he looks
to the state court cases and finds that they balanced the benefit received
by the land owner as well as the burden endured.' 08 The reduced risk of
flooding based upon improvements to the floodplain is a form of like-kind
exchange that, ought to be considered when analyzing the compensable
consequences of a particular government action. In contradiction to Ep-
stein's nuisance rationale (and, in fact, a retreat from its harsher implica-
tions), the Lucas Court noted that "[w]here the State seeks to sustain
regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it
may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were
not part of his title to begin with."'10 9
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Lucas, concluded
that for a state to avoid paying compensation' for a regulation that elimi-
nates all economic value of a piece of real property, the regulation must be
justified by reference to background common-law principles of property
and nuisance law. 110 This, of course, has always been the law and is
merely a way of saying that the state did not deprive the aggrieved prop-
104 Id. at 2319-20.
105 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
106 Id. at 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2324 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
It is not merely state cases, but our own cases aswell, that require the analysis
to focus on the impact of the city's action on the entire parcel of private property. In
Penn Central,... we stated that takings jurisprudence "does not divide a single par-
cel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. Instead, this Court focuses "both on the char-
acter of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Penn Central 'PYansp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-
31 (1978)).
108 Id. at 2323-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (disagreeing with
Justice Stevens's contention that the appropriate inquiry is to the generality of the regula-
tion). Justice Antonin Scalia distinguishes real property from personalty for purposes of the
compensation inquiry when all exchange or use value is destroyed. Id. at 1027-28.
110 Id. at 1031-32.
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erty owner of any cognizable property right. But this does not answer the
question of compensation in cases in which the regulation works a dimi-
nution in value, unless Justice Scalia means the test to apply to each seg-
mentable property interest-a point that Justice Scalia concedes.1 11 There
can be no doubt, however, that the state may, through a change in the
general law, make what was once permissible now impermissible so long
as there is a sufficient finding that the change was necessary to prevent a
public harm. I recognize, as did. Justice Anthony Kennedy in his concur-
rence, that. the harm/benefit distinction is notoriously unstable, but this
instability is not a sufficient reason to believe that a legislature is limited
to the common-law definition of nuisance when attempting to regulate for
the "general welfare."112
I want to conclude this cursory discussion of the law with a brief
discussion of, the idea that seems so troubling to those who want to find a
"principled" basis for takings decisions and who seem disgusted by the
notion that the Court is acting in an ad hoc manner when deciding these
cases. The notion can be traced back to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's
decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon..113 The approach has been criti-
cized as allowing any eventuality to obtain. In fact, Holmes was attempting
to-articulate the basis for the creation of objective standards.1 14 This pro-
cess is best captured by reference to the epistemology of the Pragmatists,
under whose sway Holmes clearly was. That view can best be summed up
as follows: "[I]nquiry is a never-ending process whose purpose is to re-
solve doubts generated when experience does not mesh with precon-
ceived theory. 1 15 Holmes clearly concurred in this formulation when he
said, in Rideout v. Knox,116 "the limit up to which a man may impair his
neighbor's enjoyment of his estate by the mode of using his own is fixed
by external standards only."11 7 Holmes underlined this in Hudson Water
Co. v. McCarter:118
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet
all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are
other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which becomes
strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached. The limits set
to property by other public interests present themselves as a branch of what is
111 Id. at 1016 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economi-
cally feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the
'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured."); see also Sax, Private
Property, supra note 16, at 151-55; Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1614-15 (1988) (describing how the same regulation can be described either as a "par-
tial" or "total" taking).
112 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113 260 U.S. 393 (1922); accord Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114 Thie following discussion is based on similar analysis in Gerald Torres, Wetlands and
Agriculture: Environmental Regulation and the Limits of Private Property, 34 KAN. L. REV.
539, 559 (1986).
115 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 50 (1977).
116 148 Mass. 368 (1889).
117 Id. at 372.
118 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
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called the police power of the State. The boundary at which the conflicting
interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but
points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or
that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side....
It is sometimes difficult to fix boundary stones between'the private right
of property and the police power .... But it is recognized that the State as
quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public has a standing
in court to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its terri-
tory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land
most immediately concerned. 119
Unfortunately, the cases have not focused on the police power sim-
pliciter, but rather on the "goes too far" language in Pennsylvania
Coal.120 The search for what is "too far" has produced the diminution in
value inquiry and now the partial takings arguments. Instead, the analysis,
even by Holmes's admission, should have focused on that "neighborhood
of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular
right is founded, and which becomes strong enough to hold their own
when a certain point is reached."121 What Holmes was describing is the'
way in which policy is created both logically and prudentially. He was
articulating a system for recognizing when a particular position is of
doubtful authority. By referring to a system of'rights (and within it a sys-
tem for their evolution), he .was rejecting a sterile search for first princi-
ples, because he was conscious of the fact that so-called first principles
are never unmediated. The way in which they are mediated (the way in
which we recognize their legitimate evolution) is by constantly comparing
the principle in question with the "neighboring" principles that are not in
question in this case, but which describe the boundaries of the issue under
consideration. Too great a deviation from the norms described by the fam-
ily of principles suggests the potential illegitimacy of the deviation. Impor-
tantly, it does not foreclose that "deviation" for all time necessarily, but
cabins it when the deviation would render a system of principled restraint
unstable. This approach to the problems of the extent of governmental
regulatory power reveals the constellation of rights, powers, liabilities,,
and immunities as a dynamic system, not as the mere ordinal ranking of
predetermined claims. That such a dynamic approach to analysis and adju-
dication leaves much undecided is not a demerit and, in fact, is an impor-
tant value. To focus upon only that which is still in general social dispute
is to lose sight of all that is not in dispute. Worse, such a focus ignores the
general stability of the system that has protected "property rights," even if
it has emerged only fitfully, and even if it has been tempered by the "neigh-
borhood of principles," not in dispute, on which we rely.
119 Id. at 355.
120 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
121 Hudson Water Co., 209 U.S. at 355.
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IV. CONCLUSION
I want to conclude this Lecture with some suggestions about what the
struggle over these issues means for our history and our conception of
social life. In many ways, the conflict over our history is what makes this
moment-a moment in which the narrative construction of our social life
is deeply contested-a deeply significant one. The history of sectionalism
in our country has always reflected deeply rooted divisions over- how our
nation ought to be organized. The revival over the past twenty years of
concern with "our federalism" reflects the tension that is at the heart of
our system of governance.122 These tensions also reflect the ways our cul-
ture has been transformed in the past generation under the pressures of an
economy that has begun to move past its extractive and heavy manufac-
turing phase. 23 The translation of those tensions into political issues-
and the translation of political issues into legal issues and issues of
"rights"-also reflects traditional American ways of confronting difficult
social problems. But, as I hope I have illustrated, more is at stake than the
constitutionality of the various environmental statutes that have been en-
acted over the past generation-although those statutes are critically im-
portant and supported by a majority of Americans. Limitations on
majoritarian policymaking, beyond the existing constitutional limitations
on government, are also part of the so-called property rights agenda and
should not be obscured by the narrative devices employed by self-de-
scribed property rights advocates.
The emotional pull and persuasive force of the story told by these
property rights advocates stems not only from their ability to tell a good
story, but also from the real connections the story makes to a way of life
and the pressures that are making that life increasingly less tenable. Be-
cause I am a Westerner by birth and disposition, although I have lived for
much of the past two decades in the Midwest, I feel a great deal of sympa-
thy for those who make a living off the land. I have watched family farm
and ranch operations struggle over the recent past, beset by the- vagaries
of the natural resource economy. I can appreciate the tug of those felt
injustices. When one speaks to farmers, ranchers, and others in rural
America, one begins to appreciate the "way of life" arguments that are
pooh-poohed as mere sentimentalism by economists and some policymak-
ers. These "way of life" arguments make sense in the context of a rural
economy that is being transformed more quickly than the social system
can accommodate. These facts do not make the doctrinal arguments of the
122 For examples of the continuing reevaluation of the nature of the national authority,
see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (federal legislation exceeded congressional
authority under Commerce Clause); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, No. 94-12, reviewing Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988 violates sovereign immunity of the states guaranteed by the 11th
Amendment).
123 The "rust belt" crisis of the 1970s and the "farm crisis" of the 1980s were also emblem-
atic of this phenomenon.
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property rights advocates correct, but they do make the arguments and
their rhetorical force more understandable.
Essayist William Kittredge makes a similar point:
[A]U over the West, as in all of America, the old folkway of property as an
absolute right is dying. Our mythology doesn't work anymore.
We find ourselves weathering a rough winter of discontent, snared in the
uncertainties of a transitional time and urgently yearning to inhabit a story that
might bring sensible order to our lives-even as we know such a story can only
evolve through an almost literally infinite series of recognitions of what, indi-
vidually, we hold sacred. The liberties our people came seeking are more and
more constrained, and here in the West, as everywhere, we hate it.
Simple as that. And we have to live with it. There is no more running
away to territory. This is it, for most of us. We have no choice but to live in
community. If we're lucky we may discover a story that teaches us to abhor
our old romance with conquest and possession.124
He is right, people hate it. They reject the close of the mytho-histori-
cal phase of American history that has been called "the opening of the
West." The story has never been completely told and is largely myth, but
old romances and generational connections to the land don't change eas-
ily. But the history of federal control over national resources is not uncon-
stitutional and the Fifth Amendment is a poor tool to overrule our national
history. No historical course is ever inevitable, which is why the debate
over property rights and the government's role in 'regulating the social
consequences of private behavior matter so much. As religious historian
Jaroslav Pelikan has said:
Ultimately, however, tradition will be vindicated for us, for each of us as
an individual and for us as communities, by how it manages to accord with our
own deepest intuitions and highest aspirations .... Those intuitions and aspi-
rations tell us that there must be a way of holding together what the vicissi-
tudes of our e~xperience have driven apart-our realism about a fallen world
and our hope for what the world may still become, our'private integrity and our
public duty, our hunger for community and our yearning for personal fulfill-
ment, what Pascal called "the grandeur and the misery" of our common
humanity.' 25
124 WiuAM KrrrREDGE, OWNING IT ALL 67-68 (1987).
125 JAROSLAV PEUIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 60 (1984). I was drawn to the work of
Kittredge and Pelikan by Indian law scholar Frank Pommersheim. See FRANK POMMERSHmM,
BRAID OF FEAmRS (1995) (offering a "reservation perspective" of Indian law and remarking
on the significant role, due to tribal ownership of many natural resources, that Indian tribes
play in both the political and economic life of the West).
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